AI依存で「わからない」が消える【3,132人の実験で判断力を検証】

"In five experiments (N = 3,132; four preregistered, one direct replication), participants answered difficult questions and could always decline to respond."（Abstract）／"Participants in the baseline condition were substantially more likely to suspend judgment than participants who could seek AI advice (0.36 vs. 0.06; one-tailed t-test: t = 8.295, p < .001; see Figure 1a)"（Study 1a）／"Participants in the baseline condition were again substantially more likely to suspend judgment than participants who could seek AI advice (0.44 vs. 0.03; t = 11.772, p < .001; see Figure 1b)"（Study 1b）— arXiv 論文より

"We engineered the questions so that AI advice was wrong, separating AI use from its accuracy."（Abstract）— arXiv 論文より

"in the absence of monetary incentives, participants answered more questions but were correct about a third as often as when AI was unavailable (pooled correctness: 27.5% vs. 9.2%), while confidence was roughly two and a half times as high (mean confidence: 29.6 vs. 75.9). Without incentives, AI access made people far more assured and far less accurate."（Discussion）— arXiv 論文より

"Across Studies 2–4, then, our pre-registered prediction of a negative AI × stakes interaction on suspension was not supported (p = .274, .506, and .784, respectively). AI availability and stakes acted largely independently: AI sharply reduced suspension regardless of stakes, while stakes modestly increased suspension—most clearly in Study 3—regardless of AI."（Study 4）— arXiv 論文より

"Incentivizing accuracy and penalizing inaccuracy led participants to seek and follow AI advice less, answer more accurately, and suspend judgment more often, though still far less than when AI was unavailable."（Abstract）／"Like Study 2, when AI advice was available, monetary stakes increased correctness (0.11 vs. 0.16; b = 0.055, SE = 0.017, t = 3.164, p = .002). By contrast, when AI advice was unavailable, stakes had no effect on correctness (0.28 vs. 0.27; b = -0.009, SE = 0.022, t = -0.382, p = .703; see Figure 3b)"（Study 3）／"Participants sought AI advice substantially less frequently when stakes were present than when they were absent (4.53 vs. 5.27 times out of six questions; b = -0.744, SE = 0.182, t = -4.083, p < .001; see Figure 3c)"（Study 3）— arXiv 論文より

"Study 4 (N = 853) therefore removed participants' control over whether to receive AI advice. It was identical to Study 3 except that, in the conditions where AI advice was available, it appeared automatically rather than on request."／"Access to AI advice continued to dramatically reduce judgment suspension, both when monetary stakes were absent (0.35 vs 0.01; b = -0.333, SE = 0.029, t = -11.56, p < 0.001) and when they were present (0.39 vs 0.07; b = -0.322, SE = 0.032, t = -10.18, p < 0.001)."（いずれも Study 4）— arXiv 論文より

"As AI suggestions grow ubiquitous and unsolicited, they may not simply affect answer accuracy; they may even alter the metacognitive threshold at which people decide whether they know enough to answer."（Abstract）／"the near-elimination of suspension under AI access is not a fixed cognitive limitation but a contextual response that monetary consequences partly correct: people can recruit their own judgment when motivated, so what AI changes is willingness, not capacity."／"These findings can be read through the notion of epistemia … : the tendency to accept AI outputs for their surface plausibility and syntactic coherence rather than through verification."（いずれも Discussion）— arXiv 論文より